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AIR  
SECURITY INFORMATION

NSMA 09597

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Chief, SR  
Chief, SE  
Chief of Station, Frankfurt

14 May 1952

REDSOX/AECOB

GE Study Regarding Cleveland O. HAHN.

Ref: Memorandum of 25 April 52 from Identity 1 to [ ]

1. We have read with interest a memorandum, carried to this base by [ ], bringing out the GE aspects of Cleveland O. HAHN's operational history. We appreciate the author's comment that his memorandum should be treated as suggestion or reflection rather than accusation, and realize the difficulties he must have had in formulating it, especially in view of [ ] comment that DYCELINE files on the case have not been completely available to even such DYCELINE officials as himself.

2. Although [ ] copy of the memorandum had been passed almost beyond recognition prior to his departure, and although [ ] himself was unable to restore all the gaps, we believe that the following comments will help to clarify the situation. We request that they be passed on to the author of the memo, Identity 1, so that he can make a more formal study, the early reception of which we should greatly appreciate.

3. HAHN was definitely employed by TILBURY, and consequently by the ZIEBARDS, and was trained for an infiltration mission with VALDENMAR. He says he was not sent simply because he was not chosen (VALDENMAR, a recent returnee, being an obviously better candidate). MPILLION has claimed that he and MPILLION persuaded HAHN he could do more good on the outside. The most reasonable assumption, however, is that he was turned down because of the condition of his heart, which our tests have shown to be in too poor shape for such activity. He had, of course, limited access to the VALDENMAR channel through his continued contact with TILBURY and his associates, especially Dr. GINTERS, until late 1950.

4. HAHN was approached by at least the Danes and the British before DYCELINE contact. Whatever the Danish offer, we feel his reasoning in rejecting it in favor of DYCELINE is obvious, since, established plan or not, the DYCELINE potential for helping the underground is clearly greater than that of the Danes—or, at least, it must have seemed to HAHN. He did actually cooperate with the British to some extent, even supplying them with the means of contacting VALDENMAR. (While HAHN claims not to know whether they did so, we feel they must have.) After literally giving them this contact, and a separate signal plan, he heard nothing more from the British—not even a thank-you note. If true, it

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can be assumed he was sufficiently disenchanted that, considering also his belief in DYCLAIM's great potential, he preferred the DYCLAIM connection. We cannot overlook the fact that he and his wife desire to emigrate to the US, where his mother-in-law is married to a US citizen. As far as the TIEBARS are concerned, he was disillusioned with them for their failure to retrieve VALDEMAR (a close personal friend of HAHN's, whom he has known at least since they were classmates in 1936), as well as by TILBURY's injection of politics into the VALDEMAR picture.

5. With respect to HAHN's leaving Sweden, several factors are involved. The early difficulties were of two sorts, one being that an alien does not acquire permission to travel until after a certain waiting period consequent to his application, which waiting period was shortly due to expire. From our point of view, we wanted him here as quickly as possible so that planning for the operation could commence without further loss of valuable time. Consequently we arranged for the office of the Combined Travel Board in Stockholm to provide him with a Travel Document in his true name (he had no supporting documents in other names), listing him as of German nationality. He was to leave the next day, to avoid the notice of the local authorities. By that time, however, five months after the original plan, he had received his Swedish pass. Since he had no time to get a German entry visa on his Swedish pass, he simply left Sweden on the Swedish pass and entered Germany on the German one. The German officials were somewhat puzzled by the lack of Swedish exit stamp, but took no action. Stamps in the passes support his story. It must be understood that he never made a formal request to leave Sweden, since the pass allows the bearer to leave the country at any time for Western European destinations. --The above does not preclude, of course, the possibility of extensive Swedish knowledge, but neither can it alone form the basis for such a consideration.

6. The statement that HAHN should keep up his TIEBAR contacts was made on our initiative, not his. Our staff personnel involved at that time had no knowledge of the TILESTONE/TIRESCHE arrangements of DYCLAIM and naturally assumed that information on the TIEBARS activities would be of interest to DYCLAIM. It does not seem to us that the statement is indicative of anything except the lack of coordination existing at that time.

7. From HAHN's statements, assuming they reflect his true belief, we have concluded that, whatever the actual case, HAHN himself feels that the interests of the TIEBARS and ourselves are indeed far apart. He believes that the TIEBAR interest is merely in setting up a listening post to gain some advance knowledge of war. He believes that DYCLAIM interest goes beyond and that DYCLAIM will give active support to the partisans for whom he seeks aid. Presuming the TIEBAR officer (Captain ANDREASSON, by the way) knew HAHN was working in another service, we should certainly think he would attempt to keep up contact. HAHN's version, however, is that ANDREASSON told him he had no objection to his working for another service as long as he did it outside Sweden, since he was liable to get into trouble there because the TIEBARS could not control the local internal security service. We do not know enough about TIEBAR affairs to conclude whether or not this is a normal TIEBAR attitude towards Balts who have ceased work with them.

8. We must point out that implementation of the action suggested in the memorandum would be both difficult and inconclusive in the first two cases at

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least. If HAHN is actually connected with the TIEBARS, it is extremely unlikely that we should ever hear any reflection of information planted with him, although the TIEBARS connection does offer a possibility. We will be glad to plant any information which Headquarters may suggest, providing we can foresee no repercussions at our end. The possibilities of the second suggestion are negated by the fact that a complete surveillance of anyone in this area is impossible without the use of indigenous personnel. We feel reluctant to pinpoint anyone as sensitive, and in as sensitive an area, as HAHN to this extent. Past experience with mail intercept has shown we are not sure of complete coverage, and here again, the persons doing the work are indigenous to this area.

9. The third suggested action is complicated by only one factor--HAHN's heart. However, unless his condition has deteriorated greatly since his last CARRIAGE, that should cause no trouble--although a specific interrogation is obviously more of a strain than a general one. The questions suggested are excellent ones, although (as the author mentions) they must be rephrased slightly to come within the limits of CARRIAGE--which permits only Yes or No answers. HAHN does, of course, assume that his letters to [ ] are photostated and translated, and has often said so, without rancor. (MFPILLOW has often said so with rancor.) Question 2 would require a detailed interrogation of HAHN, then CARRIAGE with several yes-or-no questions based on the results of the interrogation. We believe that Question 3 would not prove a thing and would only result in a discussion of "intelligence" as distinguished from "executive action". It should be interesting to pose, however, again, CARRIAGE would have to be based on the results of interrogation. Question 4 would result in an "as-far-as-I-know" answer and would have to be put on that basis, made more definite by substituting "supplying information about our activities to" for "communication with". Question 5 is very nicely specific. Question 6 would again result in an inconclusive answer, since we have never instructed HAHN to keep anything from [ ] as long as he does not use the open mails. It must be remembered that [ ] is an equal in their triumvirate. Question 7 is a bit general, but we realize the aim of it. A breach in this respect would indeed be most indicative, since we have specifically instructed HAHN against it and he has expressed his complete agreement with our feelings. He realizes that silence is one of the main conditions of our work together. It seems doubtful, however, that he would reveal his association with us to an emigre group as an influence wedge, since (a) he lives here under an alias, which would make it a little difficult to start a political career, and he has no political standing even in his own name; (b) he seems too intelligent to attempt to base a political career, or even an influential position, on a factor so uncertain, so incapable of proof, and so potentially disastrous to himself if we heard of it, as mention of his connection with us. It must be remembered that HAHN is physically under our control, as is his family. Whereas an already prominent political figure, LIPINS or even JAHRS for example, could capitalize on such connections with more or less immunity from repercussions, any action (and he cannot know how severe such action might be) we might take toward HAHN would attract little attention in the world. And of course, once his connection with us is gone, so is his "influence wedge", and his wife would never see her mother in the States. We feel he would consider the stakes too high.

10. The points mentioned in the last paragraph of the memorandum do indeed make the case unusual. A glance at the TILESTONE/VALDEMAR traffic, however, bears out the fact that VALDEMAR's crystals actually were lost. Regarding the

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plane expedition, there are no records at this station, although several people remember the general story from Headquarters' files. In any case, it seems likely that JAYHAWK was actually behind it, since the pilot was said to be British and also supplying the funds himself. It seems unlikely that we shall ever know the true reasons for his withdrawal, but as far as we know, the JAYHAWKS have never received permission to carry out air operations in the Baltic, and perhaps they concluded that a British pilot would cause too provocative a situation if shot down.

11. It must be pointed out that the process by which summaries of HAHN's letter to [ ] have been written is nowhere nearly as formal as the phrase "summaries which he submitted" would indicate. [ ] had too little time for that, and had been reassured by the belief that [ ] was reading the copies which we sent to Headquarters. This memo is the first sign, in about 6 months of HAHN-[ ] correspondence, that anything untoward [ ] expected by Headquarters. The main purpose of the summaries was to keep [ ] generally informed. We request that, in the future, Headquarters take over this function. The summaries have been made from notes taken on HAHN's verbal summaries in German. As pointed out in a previous dispatch, the meanings may not be clear because of (a) translation from one language into another through a third; (b) possibly too drastic summarization; (c) the use of innuendo and oblique reference, as well as code names, designed to sterilize the contents in case they were found on the person of [ ] or our cut-out. We feel that HAHN had little to gain, and much to lose, through deception, because: (a) he assumes, and has said so, that copies of the letters are read here or in Headquarters; (b) he could easily correspond with [ ] through the international mails, using open code or even cipher or rudimentary S/W; (c) he could use a prearranged letter-frequency cipher or open code in these very letters. The possibilities of undetectable deception are so great that we feel he [ ] will shortly make an analysis of the letters and summaries which should clarify the question.

12. In conclusion, we wish to repeat that we certainly appreciate this type of analysis, and have indeed an even greater interest in it than anyone else, since we are so close to the principal suspects. We hope we have materially added to the information on which a more formal study can be based. We also request that any questions or doubts which Headquarters may have be expressed to us as soon as they come to mind, thereby saving much time and worry in both Headquarters and the Field, as well as allowing suspicions to be either confirmed or denied before they come to be regarded as facts merely because of repetition. We are always suspicious of our operations from the CE standpoint, and are only too glad to run to ground any indication of deception.

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25 April 1952

**TO:**  
**FROM:**  
**SUBJECT:**

The following observations are offered with a complete awareness by the writer that his acquaintance with the case under scrutiny is slight. For this reason, everything which follows should be treated as suggestion or reflection rather than as conclusion, for that is the writer's intention.

It seems likely that this case is known to, i.e. penetrated by, the entire history of the operation points in that direction. Hahn's initial contact with, and prospective employment by, the [redacted] showed his identification with them; his use of the [redacted] (1), even though he says that he used it for his own protection in his presence when the [redacted] suggested a [redacted] (2); the completion of (1) by the fact that the [redacted] were parties to [redacted] (3); the possibility for Hahn's survival before he was assumed by [redacted] (4); it became apparent that the [redacted] had an established [redacted] (5); it will that the [redacted] (6); penetration of the fact that Hahn left [redacted] through normal channels [redacted] (7); his departure, and, it may be assumed, with the knowledge of [redacted] (8); compel us to believe that [redacted] knew Hahn, knew what and where he was going, under whose auspices, and at least something about what he was going to do. With respect to Hahn's leaving [redacted] (9); one gains the impression that there appeared to be initial difficulties with respect to his departure, (3)(4) such difficulties as to invite suggestion of clandestine exit---after which the difficulties seem to have disappeared. (5) It would be good to know just what the source was of Hahn's request to leave [redacted] territory. Finally, there is a direct statement, capable of limited interpretation, that the future activities of Hahn's group will "include maintaining proper relationship with the official [redacted] agency in order to keep track of the possibilities which might be opened".(6) To the writer, it would appear that the foregoing facts indicate that [redacted] knew something about the operation in its early stages, and may have been kept so courant later. Whether this penetration ever reached the point of supervision or control is not yet apparent.

To reject this possibility on the basis of any man's moral sense would be unwise. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to examine hypothetical motives, it might be wise to suggest that an occasional report from Hahn to the [redacted] could be rationalized on the grounds that the interests of the [redacted] and those [redacted] are not too far apart while any interest by the [redacted]

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in Hahn's operations on behalf of the \_\_\_\_\_ is entirely justifiable in professional counter-espionage. I should say even that an IO or a CEO who did not endeavor to maintain contact with someone he knows working in another service would be lacking in perception.

Where such contact or penetration is conducted by a friendly power, it represents only an extension of security, in which it becomes additional to reassure one's self of the security maintained by the unexpected recipient. In this case, the situation could be complicated by the fact that \_\_\_\_\_ interest would be exercised by their Baltic States Division, wherein the Latvian responsibility is discharged by \_\_\_\_\_, himself a native of Latvia.

The important question, it seems to me, is whether Hahn is or is not keeping the \_\_\_\_\_ informed of our operations and personnel; and we must bear in mind the fact that while such possibility is disturbing from the point of view of good security, it need not be construed as reprehensible. To resolve this question the following action is suggested:

1. Information should be planted on Hahn---information which is fictitious, but of such nature that it would be of great interest to \_\_\_\_\_. A reflection of such information in \_\_\_\_\_ would indicate the existence of a channel of communication.

2. An informal conference by one of our people in \_\_\_\_\_ with a close officer of \_\_\_\_\_, in which there would be buried some direct statement that "old Hahn----you know him, he was connected with you at one time----has been doing some work for us. Sadly enough, we've learned that he has been passing operational information to someone outside our own show. We don't know to whom, but we're going to give him a thorough examination and find out. How do you regard him?". Especially if a specific time not too far distant were mentioned for the interrogation, \_\_\_\_\_ might take the protective step of warning Hahn. A complete surveillance of the subject for a few days (until the specified date had passed) would include interception of all communications to him. This, too, might be productive.

3. A carriage test for Hahn might be run in with notional tests of the same type for other or all personnel in his branch as a "periodic routine security measure". Such a test might include such questions as the following: (It is recognized that these questions would have to be re-phrased)

1. Did you know that your letters to \_\_\_\_\_ are being photostated and translated?
2. What \_\_\_\_\_ officials did you see prior to your departure? What did they say to you?
3. To what extent do you believe that the interest of \_\_\_\_\_ and the \_\_\_\_\_ with respect to intelligence, are compatible?

**SECRET**  
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4. Is PILLOW or [ ] in communication with the
5. Are you in communication with
6. How much information to [ ]
7. Devotion to Faigre groups as an influence wedge

In concluding, there are one or two other points which make this case unusual. The story, early in the file, that the operator sent to Latvia has lost all his crystals invites scrutiny. The story that the [ ] had withdrawn their support from a proposed operation because one man, who was to pilot the plane, refused to provide finances, nothing should be run to ground. There must have been some reason for this action. Did the [ ] regard the proposed operation as insecure? If so, why? Finally, it seems that Hahn's summaries of his correspondence may not have been comprehensive. It is recommended that the photostats of his letters be read in detail, and be compared with the summaries which he submitted.

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